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PRAGMATIC COMPETENCE IN CHILDREN WITH ASD AND
OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
Pragmatic Competence in ASD
Pragmatic skills enable children to produce and comprehend words and sentences in ways that
are appropriate to the conversational context. While structural language is known to vary widely
in children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD), pragmatic language has been claimed to be
consistently impaired within this population, and has been considered a hallmark of ASD (Volden
and Phillips, 2010). Specially, people with ASD frequently demonstrate unusual or inappropriate
conversational behavior and deficits in a wide range of pragmatic skills (Philofsky et al., 2007).
These difficulties have been experimentally demonstrated in detecting violations of maxims of
conversation (Surian et al., 1996), understanding figurative language (Happé, 1993; Norbury,
2005), using context to disambiguate polysemous words (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Brock
et al., 2008), managing topic maintenance and topic shifts (Volden and Phillips, 2010), and
comprehending humor, drawing inferences from narratives and understanding indirect requests
(Ozonoff and Miller, 1996).
Pragmatic difficulties are often attributed to intrinsic features of ASD. These include a weaker
tendency to integrate information from the context (Weak Central Coherence; Happé and Frith,
2006), a deficit in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) that prevents children with ASD from inferring
intentions and mental states of other people (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), a deficit in executive
functions such as poor inhibition or cognitive flexibility (Hill, 2004) or lack of social motivation
as a result of an attenuated social instinct (Chevallier et al., 2012).
Pragmatics in Other Communication Disorders
Children with developmental disorders with communication problems in the absence of ToM
deficits like Specific Language Impairment (SLI), also display pragmatic difficulties when
screening instruments and conversational analysis are used (Adams, 2002; Norbury et al., 2004).
Experimental studies have shown that children with SLI face deficits in sensitivity to maxims of
conversation, figurative language understanding, narrative or use of context to resolve ambiguities
(Surian et al., 1996; Norbury, 2004, 2005; Brock et al., 2008; Katsos et al., 2011; Norbury et al.,
2014), and that their pragmatic skills are in keeping with levels of their structural language, as they
perform as successfully as younger typically-developing (TD) children matched on language level
at experimental tasks.
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Nevertheless, the extent of pragmatic impairments in children
with ASD and other children with social communication
disorders, as well as the underlying cause of these impairments,
is still an open question for research and practitioners (Adams,
2002; Norbury, 2014).
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF PRAGMATIC
DIFFICULTIES IN ASD
Recent research has questioned the traditional views of pragmatic
competence in ASD: Are children with ASD universally
challenged by pragmatics? Are these challenges due to some
deficit of ToM intrinsic to ASD?
The Role of ToM
The literature reveals reliable associations between the process of
understanding the ironic meaning of utterances and ToM skills.
For example, there is correlational evidence between success
with irony understanding and passing False Belief tasks both
in children with ASD and TD (Happé, 1993; Filippova and
Astington, 2008), as well as evidence that irony comprehension
and ToM processing activate the same neural regions in neuro-
typical adults (Spotorno et al., 2012).
However, Norbury (2004, 2005, 2014) and Happé (1993)
reached different conclusions as regards the role of ToM in
pragmatic competence of children with ASD. An alternative
proposal is that the pragmatic language deficits observed in
children with ASD are due to difficulties with grammar and
vocabulary, known collectively as structural language (Norbury,
2005; Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit, 2012).
The Role of Structural Language: Grammar
and Vocabulary
In particular, Norbury (2004, 2005) put this hypothesis to the
test by studying four groups of children with the presence or
absence of ASD and of Language Impairment (LI) in metaphor
and idiom tasks (ASD-LI; ASD+LI; LI; and age-matched TD).
Crucially, structural language competence was measured both
expressively and receptively, and both in terms of vocabulary and
grammar. It was found that all groups with language impairment
(ASD+LI and LI) were indeed impaired in comprehension of
metaphors and idioms, but the group with ASD-LI (without LI)
performed as well as the TD participants. Moreover, regression
analyses revealed that structural language and world-knowledge
were the critical predictors for idioms and metaphors, whereas
ToM was not. Furthermore, a recent meta-analytic review of
experimental studies in figurative language concluded that the
differences between children with ASD and TD groups were
not statistically significant when the groups were matched on
language ability (Kalandadze et al., 2016).
Likewise, it has been demonstrated that children with
ASD perform as well as TD peers on the ability to detect
pragmatic violations, such as utterances that are literally true
but pragmatically under-informative (e.g., “some of the apples
are inside the boxes” when shown a picture where all of the
apples are inside the boxes), and that higher verbal IQ scores
predicted higher sensitivity to under-informativeness within the
ASD group (Chevallier et al., 2010). Similar conclusions are
reached in studies with an adult ASD population (Pijnacker
et al., 2009). However, in the two last studies, the lack of
ToM measures prevents establishing a unique contribution of
structural language.
TWO DIFFERENT PRAGMATIC SKILLS:
LINGUISTIC- VS. SOCIAL-PRAGMATICS
Here we propose that the relationship between pragmatics,
structural language and ToM is not “fixed” but rather
modulated by specific properties of the interaction (lexical,
syntactic and social-interactional aspects)1. In addition to
differences in measurement of independent factors (e.g.,
measuring ToM and structural language in different ways),
an element that may explain the variation in research
findings within the ASD population is that different ways of
testing pragmatics may differentially engage structural language
and ToM.
A distinction between types of pragmatic inferences has
gained much support in the theoretical pragmatics literature,
classified by the extent to which they require ToM skills:
Sperber (1994) mentions “Egocentric Relevance” (which
does not involve ToM skills), “Allocentric Relevance” (which
requires 1st order ToM) and “Gricean” interpretative strategies
(which require 2nd order ToM); Levinson (2000) distinguishes
between “generalized” and “particularized” pragmatic inferences;
Recanati (2004) introduces a distinction between “primary” and
“secondary pragmatic processes”; and more recently, O’Neill
(2012) uses the terms “social pragmatics,” “mindful pragmatics”
and “cognitive pragmatics” while Kissine (2012) discusses inter-
subjective and non-intersubjective aspects of language use. This
view has also been supported by empirical research in children
with and without communication disorders, suggesting that, for
some kinds of pragmatics, a sentence may be fully interpretable
based on pragmatic norms and the context as provided from
the listeners’ egocentric point of view, without the need to infer
the speakers’ mental state (de Villiers et al., 2007; Kissine, 2012;
O’Neill, 2012; Kissine et al., 2015; Janke and Perovic, 2016).
At this point, we suggest two new terms: linguistic-pragmatics
and social-pragmatics. We think that they are more intuitively
transparent as regards the role of structural language and ToM
in each type of pragmatic skill. The term linguistic-pragmatics
would be for those cases of pragmatics where structural language
and competence with pragmatic norms are enough to perform
successfully in the task, while we use the term social-pragmatics
for those circumstances where in addition to structural language
and pragmatics, the child needs competence with ToM, and
specifically the ability to represent other people’s intentions,
desires and beliefs.
1 An additional interaction between these concepts arises if participants use their
mastery of the syntax of complementation to pass False Belief tasks (de Villiers
et al., 2003). This is a possibility that we do not explore here but should be taken
into account in future work.
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Linguistic-Pragmatics
Sensitivity to informativeness, as tested by Chevallier et al. (2010),
Katsos et al. (2011), and Pijnacker et al. (2009) is a case in
point of “linguistic-pragmatics.” For example, in order to reject
pragmatically infelicitous sentences of a speaker saying that
“some of the apples are inside the boxes” (given a picture in
which all of the apples are inside the boxes), a child need to
draw on vocabulary knowledge (a child who has mastered the
semantic meaning of “some” and “all” will know that “all” is
a more informative expression), together with sensitivity to the
pragmatic maxim that instructs speakers to avoid being under-
informative. However, demands on ToM are minimal, because
the knowledge that is necessary to evaluate if the utterance is
informative or not is visually accessible and shared between the
child and the speaker.
As a result, empirical evidence shows that structural language
is the key predictor for success with informativeness (Pijnacker
et al., 2009; Chevallier et al., 2010 in participants with ASD;
Katsos et al., 2011, in participants with SLI).
Social Pragmatics
In contrast, there are cases that do require using ToM skills. The
irony task used by Happé (1993) is a case in point.
In one of the stories, the main character (David) is baking
a cake and places the eggs in the batter without removing the
shells, and his dad says: “What a clever boy you are, David!.”
Here, in order to understand this ironic utterance, a child needs
to use his/her competence with structural language to grasp the
literal meaning, together with the pragmatic maxim that enjoins
interlocutors to be relevant and truthful. Moreover, the child does
need to use ToM skills for two reasons. First, in order to avoid
attributing to David’s dad a false belief (David is clever), that
would nevertheless be consistent with the literal meaning of the
utterance. And second, in order to take into account the true
belief of David’s dad (David is not clever) that is inconsistent with
the literal meaning of the sentence, but becomes consistent once
pragmatic inference has taken place.
Consequently, the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994), which is
constructed on similar principles as Happé’s (1993) irony task,
could be a good measure for social-pragmatic skills. Although
this task has been typically used to assess mentalizing through
the recognition of the communicative intentions of people using
indirect or non-literal utterances, the characters of the stories
have unusual or unexpectedmental states that are not compatible
with the literal meaning of what they say. Correctly inferring
those mental states is a prerequisite for making the pragmatic
inferences that allow the participant to tell if what the characters
say is appropriate or not for the context.
We should clarify here that we do not visualize the distinction
between linguistic-pragmatics and social-pragmatics as one to do
with pragmatic phenomena per se, but with the communicative
situation. Tasks that measure informativeness, for example, need
not always fall under the umbrella of linguistic-pragmatics. There
maywell be cases where sensitivity to informativeness will require
ToM and therefore be considered social-pragmatic, e.g., in cases




The different roles of ToM and structural language in pragmatics
tasks may help to explain some of the variance in findings from
previous reports on children with ASD. We expect that the
linguistic-pragmatic difficulties of children with ASD (and of
children with other developmental disorders like SLI), will be in
keeping with structural language (grammar and vocabulary) in
tasks such as sensitivity to under-informativeness, but in keeping
with their ToM skills in tasks that require social-pragmatic
competence, such as irony stories from Happé (1994) Strange
Stories task.
Structural language is implicated in the success with
pragmatics, including metaphor understanding (Norbury, 2004),
informativeness (Pijnacker et al., 2009; Chevallier et al., 2010),
idioms (Norbury, 2005), use of context for disambiguation
(Brock et al., 2008), and it is one of the significant (if not
the only) predictors of success. This highlights the importance
of considering structural language when assessing pragmatic
difficulties, in order to establish whether any pragmatic
difficulties go beyond the overall linguistic differences that a child
presents.
Furthermore, structural language must have a key role in
intervention. It is likely that in addition to interventions that
directly target pragmatic competence, support for structural
language is the one component that will benefit all children
who show pragmatic difficulties (Kalandadze et al., 2016).
Additionally, intervention with ToM is also likely to support
pragmatic language in some specific situations.
Finally, the distinction between linguistic- and social-
pragmatics may help clarify for some questions pertaining
to diagnostic categories. Social (Pragmatic) Communication
Disorder has recently been proposed as a distinct diagnostic
category (see American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Among
others, this disorder includes deficits in using communication for
social exchange, adapting communication style to the context,
following rules of conversation or narrative convention and
understanding implicit or ambiguous language (Norbury, 2014).
If our proposal is correct, these deficits are at least partially
distinct, as they include both what we called linguistic-pragmatic
and social-pragmatic competences. They are also likely to
be present in children with ASD, SLI and other disorders,
depending on the extent of structural language and ToM
impairments.
Screening instruments and diagnostic procedures that
measure communicative and pragmatic competence may
also take into account the distinction between linguistic- and
social-pragmatic competences, which at present tend not
to be differentiated (e.g., in the Children’s Communication
Checklist–2, CCC-2, Norbury et al., 2014).
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